This paper examines episodes of banking sector distress for a large sample of countries, highlighting the experience of Japan. We estimate a model that links the onset of banking problems to a set of macroeconomic variables and institutional characteristics. The model predicts a high probability of banking sector distress in Japan in the early 1990s, matching actual developments closely, and suggests that the Japanese episode fits a well-established pattern characterizing banking sector problems elsewhere. An empirical model explaining the output cost of banking sector distress is also investigated. The results indicate that output loss is smaller the more quickly banking sector problems are resolved and when exchange rate stability is maintained. Explicit deposit insurance also appears to lessen the output cost of banking sector distress. The real output loss to Japan of not resolving banking sector problems is estimated at almost 1 percent of GDP annually.
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Our major finding is that Japan's banking crisis follows a pattern found in many other countries, and formal tests do not distinguish Japan as a special case. Our model predicts that Japan was particularly "vulnerable" to banking sector distress in the early 1990s. That is, the model indicated that there was almost a 20 percent probability of banking sector distress in Japan in 1992 given the configuration of asset prices, credit conditions and other economic factors prevailing at the time. The results also indicate that output loss associated with an episode of banking sector distress is smaller the more quickly banking sector problems are resolved and when exchange rate stability is maintained. Explicit deposit insurance also appears to lessen the output cost of banking sector distress. The real output loss to Japan of not resolving banking sector problems is estimated at almost 1 percent of GDP annually. The main factor distinguishing Japan from other countries is the slow and poorly designed policy response by the Japanese government to resolve the country's financial crisis.
In the next section, Section 2, we briefly review the theoretical and empirical literature on financial and banking sector distress. In section 3 we discuss the data for the study. In section 4
we present summary statistics, comparing the economic and institutional characteristics distinguishing those countries that have experienced episodes of banking sector distress and the characteristics of economies in the lead-up to and aftermath of episodes of banking sector distress. This section also presents estimates of the probit model, and considers the predictions of the model for Japan. Section 5 presents the estimates of the model linking the output cost of banking problems to observable characteristics prior to the onset of the crisis and policy actions taken following the crisis. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Analytical issues and empirical literature
Much of the theory on banking crises focuses on the special characteristics of banks, such as maturity and currency transformation and asymmetric information, which make the industry particularly vulnerable to collapse following adverse shocks (e.g. Jacklin and Bhattacharya, 1988 and Diamond and Dybvig, 1986) . Institutional features of economies, such as the existence of deposit insurance and market-determined interest rate structure, are also emphasized in the literature as impacting the profitability of banks and the incentives of bank managers to take on risk in lending operations. The special features of banks, combined with particular institutional characteristics of economies, frequently lead to the emergence of banking problems when adverse macroeconomic shocks such as a fall in asset prices (impacting bank capital and/or collateral underlying loans) or economic activity (more delinquent loans) occurs.
Empirical regularities
Several common features of countries experiencing banking problems emerge from numerous case studies. A recent IMF (1998) report summarizes this literature and identifies several general categories of problems frequently associated with financial crises: unsustainable macroeconomic policies, weaknesses in financial structure, global financial conditions, exchange rate misalignments, and political instability. Macroeconomic instability, particularly expansionary monetary and fiscal policies spurring lending booms and asset price bubbles, has been a factor in many episodes of banking sector distress, including most experienced by the industrial countries in the postwar period. External conditions, such as large shifts in the terms of trade and world interest rates, have played a large role in financial crises in emerging-market economies. By affecting the profitability of domestic firms, sudden external changes can adversely impact banks' balance sheets.
Weakness in financial structure refers to a variety of circumstances ranging from the maturity structure and currency composition of international portfolio investment flows to the allocation and pricing of domestic credit through banking institutions. These weaknesses oftentimes arise in times of rapid financial liberalization and greater market competition, when banks are taking on new and unfamiliar risks on both the asset and liability side of balance sheets. Weak supervisory and regulatory policies under these circumstances have also increased moral hazard by giving an incentive for financial institutions with low capital ratios to increase their risk positions in newly competitive environments, and allowing them to avoid full responsibility for mistakes in monitoring and evaluating risk. Further, deficiencies in accounting, disclosure, and legal frameworks contribute to the problem because they allow financial institutions (or financial regulators) to disguise the extent of their difficulties. Governments have frequently failed to quickly identify problem institutions, or to take prompt correct action when a problem arises, resulting in larger and more difficult crisis situation.
Formal Studies on the Probability of Banking Sector Distress
Several recent econometric studies, moving beyond individual case studies and descriptive international comparisons, have tested the statistical significance of a number of variables in predicting banking sector distress. In terms of institutional characteristics, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) , estimating a probit model, find that financial liberalization increases the probability of a banking crisis. DemirghH-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a) also use probit analysis and find that financial liberalization is an important determinant of banking crises. In a related study, DemirghH-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b) find that explicit deposit insurance (increasing moral hazard) and low values of a "law and order" index (a proxy for a weaker regulatory and supervisory structure) also appear to be important institutional characteristics increasing the likelihood of a banking problem.
In terms of macroeconomic disturbances, DemirghH-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b) find that low real GDP growth is contemporaneously associated with banking crises but is not a useful leading indicator. They also find that (i) high real interest rates, (ii) high inflation, and (iii) external vulnerability (measured by a high ratio of broad money to international reserves) help predict the onset of a banking problem. Calvo (1996) argues that the M2/Reserves ratio is a good predictor of a country's vulnerability to balance-of-payments crises. Eichengreen and Rose (1998) , focusing on developing economies, find that increases in world interest rates, overvalued real exchange rates and slowing domestic output growth increase the probability of a banking problem. However, neither DemirghH-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b) nor Eichengreen and Rose (1998) find that rapid credit growth help predict exchange rate crises.
Other variables commonly found in empirical work include the government budget surplus, e.g. governments in a strong financial position may be likely to quickly re-capitalize problem banks, and the terms-of-trade.
Output Cost of Banking Crises
The theory explaining the wide variation in economic outcomes following the emergence of banking sector distress is much less well developed than that explaining why crises may arise.
Nor is there a consensus over the appropriate design of policy when confronted with a banking problem. The literature guides empirical work to some extent, however, in that several institutional characteristics and macroeconomic policy variables have been suggested as potentially important factors influencing how economies develop after the emergence of banking sector distress.
Three characteristics of economies, evident prior to the development of banking sector problems, are noted as influencing the way economies respond: the state of the business cycle ("prior state of the economy"), the rate of inflation ("prior inflation"), and whether a system of explicit deposit insurance was in place ("explicit deposit insurance"). Controlling for the state of the business cycle prior to the onset of banking problems is obviously important, as output developments around trend are highly path dependent. The rate of inflation prior to the onset of a banking problem may also influence the ultimate output cost. Financial sectors in countries with relatively high inflation over a sustained period (defined here as average inflation over a five-year period prior to the onset of banking sector problems) may already have adjusted to financial sector dislocation, investing the resources to make them less vulnerable to a banking sector problem. This is related to the "New Keynesian" view of how economies and financial sectors adjust to the historical experience of sustained inflation (Ball, Mankiw and Romer, 1988) 1 .
Deposit insurance, combined with financial liberalization, creates conditions (moral hazard) under which banking problems are more likely to occur. However, given that banking sector distress is already evident, an economy with explicit deposit insurance may be able to maintain greater confidence in the banking sector and limit contagion (e.g. depositor panic and 1 We also add an intercept dummy variable for very high inflation countries ("high inflation slope dummy").
This is defined as countries with 30 percent average annual inflation or greater in the five-year period preceding banking sector distress. Empirical evidence suggests that the response of real variables to inflation is often quite different in those economies where high inflation is the norm. bank runs). Most severe banking problems in recent decades were associated with deterioration in asset quality, not with contagion associated with bank runs. Deposit insurance may play a role in maintaining confidence in the banking system. Maintaining confidence, in turn, would presumably be associated with continuation of banking relationships and credit flows, and less output loss when a banking problem arises.
Three factors which are related to the policy response taken after banking sector distress are also frequently discussed in the literature: duration of the banking problem ("duration"), the change in policy interest rates and the rate of exchange rate depreciation. There is no single quantitative measure of the speed, effectiveness and extent of policy actions taken to contain and resolve banking sector distress. However, the duration of banking sector distress, measured simply in years during which severe banking problems are observed, serves as a rough indication of the adequacy or effectiveness of the policy response. Numerous episodes demonstrate that effective regulatory policy can contain and resolve even severe banking problems quite quickly.
But there are other cases that demonstrate how effective policies may be stymied by institutional or political factors. Regulatory authorities, for example, may follow a "forbearance" policy (inaction) or the political process may not be able to reach a consensus over the appropriate design and source of funds to re-capitalize financial institutions facing severe problems. The duration of Sweden's banking sector distress, for example, was four years and that of Japan is seven years to date. This suggests a sharp contrast in the speed and effectiveness by which the two countries responded to their respective banking problems.
The optimal policy response when confronted with banking problems is controversial. A significant decline in policy interest rates (money market rate or discount rate) at the onset of banking sector distress help offset the adverse effects on aggregate demand arising from banking sector distress 2 . Declining interest rates, however, may exacerbate banking distress by encouraging foreign capital outflows, weakening the exchange rate and generally lowering investor confidence that prudent macroeconomic policies are being followed. These two channels are likely to have offsetting effects on GDP, and the net impact is ambiguous.
2 The empirical results are not qualitatively different if short-term real interest rates are used in the regressions rather than nominal rates.
The role of exchange rates in the stability of the banking sector is also debatable and is only partially under the control of policymakers. Although exchange rate depreciation may be expected to exert a positive demand stimulus, it also incurs losses to a financial sector holding net foreign liabilities denominated in foreign currency. If the latter effect dominates, currency depreciation may worsen the banking problems and lead to a larger output loss. This effect has recently been observed in Korea, Indonesia and elsewhere in East Asia where domestic financial institutions held large net (short-term) foreign liabilities denominated in foreign currency.
Data
We follow previous studies in guiding our selection of a number of the explanatory variables. However, several variables, such as the definition of banking sector distress and measurement of the output cost of the banking crisis, require explanation.
Defining Banking Distress
Banking problems are usually difficult to identify empirically because of data limitations.
The potential for a bank run is not directly observable and, once either a bank run or large-scale government intervention has occurred, the situation most likely will have been preceded by a protracted deterioration in the quality of assets held by banks. Identifying banking sector distress by the deterioration of bank asset quality is also difficult since direct market indicators of asset value are usually lacking. This is an important limitation since most banking problems in recent years are not associated with bank runs (liability side of the balance sheet) but with deterioration in asset quality and subsequent government intervention. Moreover, it is often laxity in government analysis of banking fragility, and slow follow-up action once a problem is recognized, that allows the situation to deteriorate to the point of a major bank crisis involved large-scale government intervention.
Given these conceptual and data limitations, most studies have employed a combination of events to identify and date the occurrence of a bank crisis. Institutional events usually include forced closure, merger, or government intervention in the operations of financial institutions, runs on banks, or the extension of large-scale government assistance. Other indicators frequently include measures of non-performing assets, problem loans, and so on. We have identified and dated episodes of banking sector distress following the criteria of Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) and . If an episode of banking distress is identified in either study, it is included in our sample. If there is ambiguity over the timing of the episode, we use the dating scheme of since it tends to be more specific about the precise start and end of each episode 3 . We have updated these samples using data from the Bank for International Settlements (1998).
Although the dating of banking sector distress is somewhat arbitrary, we nonetheless follow these studies closely to avoid "data mining", i.e. identifying the date of the banking crisis after observing developments in macroeconomic and other variables thought to be determinants of the crises. Japan's banking crisis, for example, is dated by Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) as "the 1990s" and by the DemirghH-Kunt and Detragiache criteria as starting in 1992. 1992 was the first year of substantial government attention to the problem. However, the first substantial plans for restructuring a significant part of the financial sector wasn't until 1993 and many observers wouldn't characterize the Japanese banking problem as a full-blown "crisis" until 1995. On the other hand, using realistic estimates of non-performing loans as an indicator might date the beginning of Japan's banking distress already in 1991.
We initially consider data for 132 countries over the 1975-97 period, of which 67 had one or multiple episodes of banking distress. We identify 82 episodes of banking distress of different magnitudes. The minimum data requirements to be considered in this study is that GDP and inflation are available, which in turn limits the sample to 98 countries. Of this group, 44
countries had no episodes of banking distress and 53 countries (65 episodes) had severe banking problems at some time during the sample.
Institutional Variables
Our source on the existence of explicit deposit insurance is the recent survey on the issue by Kyei (1995) . We construct a dummy variable that takes a value of unity at times when a particular country had a formal system of deposit guarantee arrangements in place, and zero otherwise. In the Kyei study, forty-seven explicit arrangments were identified, as against fiftyfive arrangments implicitly guaranteeing government support for deposits. Our main source for the financial liberalization data is DemirghH-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a), supplemented by national and international sources. The variable is constructed on the basis of the beginning of observed policy changes to liberalize interest rates, taking on a value of unity during the liberalized period of market-determined rates and zero otherwise. Our central bank independence variable is taken from Cukierman (1992) . It takes on a value from zero (no independence) to unity (complete independence), and represents a weighted average of legal and institutional characteristics reflecting the central bank's relationship with the government.
Macroeconomic Variables
The macroeconomic variables employed are standard in this literature: real GDP growth, the rate of exchange rate depreciation, real credit growth, nominal (and real) interest rate increase, inflation (and a dummy variable taking on a value of unity for countries with sample average inflation rates over 30 percent, zero otherwise), the change in an index of stock prices, and the budget position of the general government. We also consider the M2/Reserve ratio (ratio of a broad money aggregate to international reserves) as an indicator of the extent to which the country is vulnerable to balances-of-payments crises.
Output cost of banking sector distress
We measure the output cost associated with each episode of banking sector distress as the present discounted value (at a 3 percent discount rate) of the cumulative output loss starting from the year after which banking sector distress is identified. The Hodrick-Prescott filter is used to estimate the "normal" or trend output level, and the output gap is measured as the period, we use a multivariate probit analysis to estimate how a particular variable changes the probability of the occurrence of banking sector distress holding constant the other explanatory factors. Table 1 shows the differences in economic characteristics between the group of countries experiencing banking distress and the group that avoided severe problems. The average values of these variables are calculated over the full sample period for those countries which have not experienced banking sector distress and over the period leading up to the banking crisis for the other countries. The objective is to identify different movements in these variables that distinguish the crisis and non-crisis countries during the periods of relative tranquillity, i.e. before banking problems become critical.
Summary Statistics
[ Table 1 about here]
The first column of statistics show the mean values for the countries not experiencing banking sector distress and the second column shows the mean values for the bank crisis
countries. The third column shows the mean difference (t-statistic) tests, and the fourth column presents the corresponding value for Japan over the period prior to the banking crisis. The standard deviations are shown in parentheses below the mean values.
The mean difference tests indicate that the rate of currency depreciation, average rate of inflation, and the M2/Reserve ratio are significantly higher in countries struck by severe banking problems. Real interest rates also appear to be marginally lower and stock price increases somewhat higher (but not significant at the 10 percent level). Average values of real GDP growth, real credit growth and budget deficits--contrary to conventional accounts--are not clearly distinguishable between the two groups.
Where does Japan fit into this general pattern distinguishing economic developments in the crisis countries from the non-crisis countries? By most indicators, Japan was in a very strong position relative to most countries before banking problems arose. Similar to others experiencing banking problems, Japan's M2/reserve ratio was substantially higher, and rise in stock prices faster, during the tranquil period than the control group. However, Japan experienced more rapid GDP growth, less exchange rate depreciation (indeed, strong appreciation), lower inflation, lower budget deficits and somewhat higher real interest rates than even the non-crisis countries. Credit growth was also slower in Japan than either the crisis or non-crisis countries. Table 2 shows the economic characteristics of the countries experiencing episodes of banking sector distress at different periods: prior to the banking crisis, the first year of the onset of the crisis, during the banking crisis, and after the crisis. The number in parenthesis below the mean value is the standard deviation of the variable. The number in brackets below the mean value is the probability that the sample mean for that period is different from the immediately preceding period. For example, real GDP growth during the first year of banking distress averaged 0.76 percent per annum (standard deviation of 5.55), a significant decline [0.00 confidence level] from the 3.50 percent average (4.39 standard deviation) recorded during the "tranquil" period before the crisis episodes.
Economic Developments Before and After Episodes of Banking Sector Distress
[ Table 2 about here]
The basic time-series statistics support the "asymmetric view". Four variables indicate a distinct shift over crisis episodes: real GDP growth, exchange rate depreciation, credit growth and stock prices. The most striking feature for the full sample is the development of real GDP and credit growth: strong growth rates prior to the crisis, recession and a contraction of credit during the first year of the crisis, and moderate rebounds during the latter phase of the episode.
Exchange rate depreciation also jumps significantly at the onset of the crisis, and the rate of stock price increase drops markedly.
In several respects, Japan experienced a similar pattern over time to other countries experiencing bank crises: a booming economy (rapid real GDP and credit growth and rising inflation) and strong asset markets (rapid stock price increase) prior to the bank crisis, followed by a sharp slowdown and falling asset prices. All of these indicators suggest that recessionary conditions and asset price deflation typically characterize banking sector distress, and that the Japanese episode clearly fits this pattern. However, one striking feature of this table is evident:
Japanese GDP growth, credit growth and stock prices failed to recover at the same pace as most other countries following the onset of the banking crisis (after the first year in the "during crisis" period). [ Table 3 about here]
Basic Results
In terms of the institutional characteristics, the coefficient estimates indicate that a high degree of central bank independence decreases the probability of banking sector distress.
Explicit deposit insurance and a liberalized financial system, by contrast, increase the likelihood of banking sector distress. In terms of macroeconomic developments, a sharp fall in real GDP growth is a very good indicator that banking problems may emerge. A fall in stock prices is also associated with an increased likelihood of banking sector distress.
By contrast with the conclusions of a number of individual case studies and descriptive international comparison studies, we find that exchange rates, real credit growth, real interest rates and inflation do not affect the likelihood of banking sector distress. That is, these variables do not help predict the occurrence of banking sector distress after controlling for the movement in stock prices, real GDP growth and institutional factors.
5

Predictions for Japan
The model estimates reported in Table 3 cover all the episodes of banking sector distress in the sample and may or may not do well in predicting the likelihood of banking sector distress in any given country at a particular point in time. That is, the model could have relatively high predictive accuracy in general but still not predict the occurrence of any particular banking crisis. Our question is whether the general statistical characteristics of banking sector distress identified by the model help to explain the timing and likelihood of the bank crisis that occurred in Japan.
To this end, Figure 1 reports the predicted probability of banking sector distress occurring in Japan during the 1980-97 period. The line labeled "predicted in-sample" uses the coefficient estimates from column 3 of Table 3 (specifications including stock price changes) to predict the probability of banking sector distress in Japan for each year. The probability was below 5 percent until 1990, at which time the probability jumps to almost 10 percent. The probability climbs further and peaks at about 20 percent in 1992. The estimated probability then declines, returning to below the 5 percent level again by 1996. These results indicate that the model does quite well in predicting the occurrence of the Japanese banking crisis. Since the institutional variables are quite stable, the results are driven by the collapse in stock prices in 1990-92 and shift from strong to weak output growth.
[Figure 1 about here]
It is noteworthy that the model's predictive accuracy is not driven by the fact that Japan is included in the data sample from which the model coefficients are estimated, and then used to 5 We also investigated using alternative measures of economic activity (real GDP as a deviation from potential GDP) and credit growth (nominal credit growth less nominal GDP growth) as explanatory variables. The explanatory power of the output measure does not increase further, however, and credit remains insignificant.
predict the probability of banking sector distress (an "in-sample prediction"). The line labeled "predicted out-of-sample" in Figure 1 shows the predicted values for Japan when Japanese data are excluded from the estimation equation 6 . The coefficients from the model (excluding Japan)
are then matched up with actual macroeconomic developments in Japan to predict the probability of banking sector distress. Although somewhat lower in magnitude, the general pattern of a sharply rising probability of banking sector distress is again clearly evident.
We also report the predicted values for Japan from the model specification excluding stock price developments (column 2 of Table 3 ). This model has more observations than the specification including stock prices but, of course, excludes an important explanatory variable.
Nonetheless, the model accurately predicts 56 percent of the banking sector distress episodes.
These predicted values, labeled "without stock prices" in Figure 1 , also indicate an increasing likelihood of banking problems in Japan in the early 1990s. The peak probability value is again reached in 1992-93, but at a lower level (around 12 percent) than previously.
Leading Indicators of Banking Sector Distress
The results reported in columns (1) -(3) of Table 3 and Figure 1 are for macroeconomic variables that are contemporaneously associated with banking crises and, hence, caution should be exercised in interpreting these as causal relationships. It is possible that the onset of banking sector distress, for example, may in turn trigger a fall in stock prices or currency depreciation.
In Japan's case, however, we know that the fall in the stock market (which peak in December 31, 1989) preceded the banking crisis by a full two years, indicating a causal link running from a collapsing stock market to a the onset of banking sector distress.
A number of previous studies have found that some variables may be useful leading indicators (as opposed to contemporaneous) of banking sector distress. The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 also suggest that a discernable pattern to macroeconomic developments may be evident prior to the onset of banking sector distress. We also estimated a simple leading indicator model-a probit equation using lagged macroeconomic explanatory variables (one-year lag). These estimates are presented in column (4) of Table 3 and the predicted values for Japan are presented in Figure 2 . The model has moderate explanatory power and correctly forecasts a high probability of a future banking crisis in 40 percent of the actual occurrences.
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The Output Cost of Banking Sector Distress
In this section we investigate the determinants of the output cost of banking crises. Given the occurrence of a banking problem, we are concerned with the factors that play a role in exacerbating the extent of the economic downturn that usually follows. Why is it that some episodes of banking distress, such as those experienced by Mexico, Finland and Spain, are associated with sharp recessions while economic activity in others, such as Paraguay and the United States, appeared not to be affected?
The output cost of banking sector distress Table 4 reports summary statistics on a number of features associated with banking sector distress. The average duration of an episode of banking sector distress in the full sample was 3.9
years. Japan's banking problem is substantially longer than the average duration. Prior to the onset of banking sector distress, most countries were in an advanced state of the business cycle (average 2.5 percent above trend GDP) and the Japanese economy, in particular, was in very strong position (4.1 percent above trend in 1991).
[ Table 4 about here]
The output loss of banking crises, taken as an average over the full sample (61 episodes), was -7.3 percent of GDP. Limiting the sample to those countries experiencing recessions following the onset of banking problems (49 countries), the output loss was -9.7 percent of GDP and output was below trend for about 3 years. Japan's output loss was less, estimated at about -4.0 percent of GDP though 1997, but a weak economy has been evident for the past 5 or 6 years (output growth slowed substantially in 1992 and economic activity fell below trend in 1993) and continued into 1998 7 .
Nominal interest rates tend to rise (1.3 percentage points) and exchange rates sharply depreciate (20 percent) the first year of banking sector distress. Japan, by contrast, saw nominal (and real) interest rates drop sharply in 1992 and the exchange rate remained fairly stable. Table 5 reports the results from the output cost regressions. Four alternative model estimations are reported. Not surprisingly, the prior state of the economy is an important control variable--highly significant and negative in all of the regressions. Explicit deposit insurance is also significantly positive, indicating that the existence of deposit insurance tends to mitigate output declines following the onset of banking problems 8 . It appears that, once the banking sector is already experiencing a problem, deposit insurance tends to dampen the adverse output effects. This supports the view that, while explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the probability of a banking problem emerging, it also seems to limit the serious of the banking crisis. The mechanism at work is not identified in our empirical work, but deposit insurance may limit bank runs and contagion once a banking problem arises 9 .
Regression results
[ Table 5 about here]
Prior inflation is also statistically significant and positive, indicating that countries with a history of moderately high inflation (prior to the emergence of banking sector problems) tend to experience less output disruption. However, the high inflation slope dummy variable is significant and negative. For those countries with a history of high inflation (above 30 percent annual average), there is no link between the inflation rate and the output cost of banking sector distress (the sum of the two inflation coefficients is not significantly different from zero).
The duration variable is also highly significant and negative. The longer the banking crisis continues, the greater is the output cost. The point estimates in Table 5 indicate that each additional year that the banking crisis continues costs the economy about 0.8-0.9 percent of GDP. By not resolving the banking crisis in 1995, for example, Japan has lost almost 3 percent of (1996-98).
Increased interest rates appear to worsen the output cost associated with banking problems and exchange rate stability (or appreciation) tends to mitigate the output cost. Only the exchange rate effect is robust in the full regression, however, shown in column 5 of Table 5 .
This may indicate that exchange rate depreciation when banking problems emerge tends to weaken the financial system, create greater uncertainty, and lead to greater output costs.
Conclusion
The analysis of macroeconomic developments before and after banking sector crises indicates that Japan followed a similar pattern to other countries experiencing banking problems. The factors leading up to the Japanese banking crisis were not unique: financial liberalization, expansionary credit growth, rapid real GDP growth and an asset price bubble.
The immediate aftermath also followed a pattern seen in other industrial economies experiencing severe banking sector distress: recession and deflation, falling asset prices, and a credit "crunch." Our empirical model predicts that Japan was particularly "vulnerable" to banking sector distress in the early 1990s. That is, the probit model estimates indicate that there was almost a 20 percent probability of banking sector distress in Japan in 1992 given the configuration of asset prices, credit conditions and other economic factors prevailing at the time Moreover, the adverse effects of the Japanese banking crisis appear no worse than experienced by many countries. By comparison with episodes in other industrial countries, however, the general malaise over the Japanese economy associated with banking sector distress appears much greater. That is, the intensity of the crisis was felt longer and more sharply in Japan than most other industrial countries. This is illustrated by the failure of asset prices to recover and the weak GDP growth/ near-recession that prevailed in Japan over much of the 1990s.
If the determinants and timing of the bank crisis in Japan seemed to conform to experiences elsewhere, why then was the Japanese problem so severe and the sense of a crisis situation so prolonged? We investigate this issue empirically by identifying factors that influence the way economies respond to banking sector distress. We focus on the "output cost" associated with episodes of banking sector distress, i.e. the (present discounted value) loss in output that may be attributed to banking problems. Beyond controlling for the state of the business cycle, potential determinants of the output cost that we consider include institutional features, such as the existence of deposit insurance, and policy measures such as the speed at which the banking problem resolved.
The results indicate that output loss associated with an episode of banking sector distress is smaller the more quickly banking sector problems are resolved and when exchange rate stability is maintained. The output cost of not resolving banking sector problems in Japan is estimated at almost 1 percent of GDP annually. Our empirical results suggest that the low interest rate policy adopted by Japan is the appropriate macroeconomic response to the severe banking problem. The slow regulatory policy response and numerous half-measures to resolve the banking crisis appear to be the main factors setting the Japanese experience apart from banking sector distress experienced in other industrial countries. Notes: * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. Contemporaneous variables are the regressors in columns (1) -(3). Lagged (one year) variables are the regressors in column (4). 1980 1985 1990 1995 Predicted in-sample Forecast
